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We review a model of imagery and memory retrieval based on allocentric spatial
representation by place cells and boundary vector cells (BVCs) in the medial temporal
lobe, and their translation into egocentric images in retrosplenial and parietal areas. In
this model, the activity of place cells constrain the contents of imagery and retrieval
to be coherent and consistent with the subject occupying a single location, while the
activity of head-direction cells along Papez’s circuit determine the viewpoint direction
for which the egocentric image is generated. An extension of this model is discussed
in which a role for grid cells in dynamic updating of representations (mental navigation)
is included. We also discuss the extension of this model to implement a version of
the dual representation theory of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in which PTSD
arises from an imbalance between weak allocentric hippocampal-mediated contextual
representations and strong affective/sensory representations. The implications of these
models for behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging data in humans are explored.
Keywords: computational model, fMRI, place cell, boundary vector cell, construction
INTRODUCTION
Consider remembering an event such as a concert that you went
to some time ago. At first you probably only retrieve a few bare
facts about the event such as where it took place, who performed
and roughly how long ago it took place. However, if asked, most
people will be able to form amental image of being at the concert,
typically centered upon where they were standing or sitting, and
from this vantage, visualize where the stage and other landmarks
were located, and who else was nearby. The formation of this kind
ofmental imagemaywell prompt the retrieval of other details that
are incorporated into the imagined scene.
This kind of rich mental imagery for events in the past is con-
sidered a hallmark characteristic of episodic recollection (Tulving,
1985). Many researchers have argued that the hippocampus plays
a critical role in this process (Kinsbourne and Wood, 1975;
O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Moscovitch, 1995; Eichenbaum and
Cohen, 2001). Rather more controversial is the suggestion that
the hippocampus is critical for constructing a coherent mental
image of a scene irrespective of whether that scene is a memory
or newly invented (Becker and Burgess, 2001; Byrne et al., 2007;
Hassabis et al., 2007b; Schacter et al., 2007), but see Squire et al.
(2010). This is the position that we will advance in this review. In
particular, we will describe the representations supported by the
hippocampus that make such imagery possible. In keeping with
the spirit of the articles in this series, we will argue that the role
of the hippocampus in mental imagery is not necessarily tied to
long-term memory.
Our position is inspired by over 30 years of research investigat-
ing the spatial firing properties of neurons in the hippocampus
of rodents. The strength of this approach is that it allows us to
specify what sort of information is represented at the level of
neurons and to make predictions about how the nature of these
representations will influence behavioral and neurophysiological
measures. Of course, the model would not be valid if, (1) there
was little correspondence between the function of the hippocam-
pus in humans and rodents, or (2) humans use different brain
regions for mental imagery of spatial scenes than they do for ori-
enting and navigating within real environments. We will present
data to address these issues. In the final section we shall detail how
the model can explain the way in which imagery can go wrong in
conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
In the concert example described above, mental imagery
involves simulating being in a specific environment. Whether
imagining past, future, or fictitious events, we typically try and
retrieve topographical features to define a coherent space within
which to locate ourselves, and then populate this space with
objects consistent with that environment. Of course, the con-
tent of our mental images are based on our experiences, either
wholly in the case of real memories, or partially, when imagin-
ing “future” or fictitious events based on our general knowledge
of the world. It is the process of combining this knowledge into a
dynamic, spatially coherent mental image that we argue requires
the hippocampus.
NEURAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE IN RODENTS
An obvious starting point for building a model of mental imagery
for scenes is to try and understand how space is represented
in the brain. A breakthrough in the understanding of this pro-
cess occurred with the discovery of place cells (O’Keefe and
Dostrovsky, 1971). Place cells recorded in freely moving rats
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each fire whenever the animal enters a specific portion of its
environment (the “place field”: O’Keefe, 1976). The firing of these
cells is independent of the orientation of the rat during free
exploration of open environments (Muller et al., 1994). Further
experiments demonstrated that place cell firing correlates with
behavioral responses in some spatial memory tasks (O’Keefe and
Speakman, 1987; Lenck-Santini et al., 2001). We can, therefore,
infer that the representation of location supported by place cells
is behaviorally relevant to the animal.
To investigate the form of the sensory input to place cells,
O’Keefe and Burgess (1996) varied systematically the shape and
size of the rat’s environment while recording from the same set
of place cells. Distortions to the environments had a number of
effects on the pattern of firing such that place fields stretched
or became bimodal when the environment expanded. These pat-
terns were consistent with place cell firing being a thresholded
sum of inputs tuned to respond to the presence of a boundary
at a given distance along a given allocentric direction (i.e., inde-
pendent of the orientation of the rat). These hypothetical inputs
were termed “boundary vector cells” (BVCs). By fitting a place
cell’s firing pattern across several different environmental shapes,
the model could successfully predict its firing pattern in environ-
ments of novel shape (O’Keefe and Burgess, 1996; Hartley et al.,
2000), see Figure 1A. More recently, the proposed BVCs, i.e., cells
responding only to the distance and allocentric direction from the
rat of an extended environmental boundary, were found in the
subiculum (Lever et al., 2009), see Figure 1B. It also seems likely
that “border cells” reported in the entorhinal cortex (Solstad et al.,
2008) are a subset of a population of BVCs that happen to fire
close to a boundary in a given allocentric direction, since entorhi-
nal cortex cells responding at greater distances from a boundary
have now been found (Koenig et al., 2011). Taken together these
findings emphasize the importance of environmental boundaries
to the hippocampal place cell representation of location within
an environment. In this view, one can think of place cell firing as
reflecting the match between the distances to boundaries around
the animal and the distances and directions to which its BVC
inputs are tuned (see Burgess et al., 1997; Hartley et al., 2000).
It is important to note that place cells are not solely driven by
sensory information. For example, after a rat has experienced an
environment, many of the cells continue to fire within their place
field when the lights are tuned out (O’Keefe, 1976). Further com-
pelling evidence for the mnemonic properties of place cells comes
from experiments in which the environmental cues controlling
place fields have been identified and it was then shown that
place fields were maintained following the removal of these cues
(Muller and Kubie, 1987; O’Keefe and Speakman, 1987; Save et al.,
2005). For example, O’Keefe and Speakman (1987) recorded place
cells whilst rats performed a “plus maze” task. Distant orient-
ing cues predicted the rewarded locations and occasionally both
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FIGURE 1 | The boundary vector cell (BVC) model of place cell firing
Hartley et al. (2000); O’Keefe and Burgess (1996). (A) The likely BVC inputs
to a place cell can be inferred from its firing pattern across environments of
different shape (left). This can be used to predict its firing pattern in new
environmental shapes (right). (B) BVCs have now been discovered: the firing
patterns are shown for three BVCs across a range of environments, including
environmental changes which cause place cell remapping, adapted from
Lever et al. (2009).
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the cues and the reward location were rotated, to ensure that the
rats used the orientation cues to solve the task. Importantly, place
fields rotated consistently with the cues. On some trials the cues
were removed, either before or after the rat was placed in the
maze. In the latter trials, the rat could perform the task based
on its memory for the cue locations, whereas on the former tri-
als it could only guess the correct location. Critically, the place
cell ensemble maintained their place fields in a manner consistent
with the animal’s choice of target location on both trial types.
These studies show that place cells do not simply fire as a result
of the sensory inputs impinging on them as a result of physically
being present in an environment. Rather, the cells are encoding
the more abstract concept of a place, in other words, a mental rep-
resentation of where the rat “thinks” it is. We speculate below, that
such representations are needed for mental imagery, which neces-
sarily requires imagining being in a different place to one’s current
location (see Becker and Burgess, 2001; Burgess et al., 2001).
It is also important to note two further aspects of place cell fir-
ing. First, in addition to spatial location within an environment,
place cells appear to signal which environment the animal is in.
Thus, the place cell representations of two very different environ-
ments are radically different, or “remapped” (e.g., Bostock et al.,
1991). Thus, if a rat is given enough experience of two perceptu-
ally similar environments, e.g., only differing in shape, the initially
similar place cell representation of both environments (consistent
with the BVC model) begins to distinguish the two environments
(Lever et al., 2002). In addition, if moved into a completely novel
environment (i.e., differing from the old one in smell, texture,
and appearance), a completely different pattern of place cell firing
is quickly established (Wills et al., 2005), see Fyhn et al. (2007)
and Jeffery et al. (2004) for further discussion of the intricacies
of place cell remapping. It may well be that, by remapping, the
place cell ensemble signals when two environments are consid-
ered sufficiently different to representing a change in “context,”
i.e., a change in the expectancy of the events or stimuli likely to be
encountered.
Second, place cell firing within a given environment is also
modulated by non-spatial information. For example, some cells
increase their firing in a specific location when the animal is
engaged in a particular type of behavior (such as running or sniff-
ing). Others fire maximally when an animal unexpectedly finds
(or fails to find) an object in a particular location (O’Keefe, 1976).
The modulation of firing rate in the place field appears to be inde-
pendent of the spatial properties of firing (Huxter et al., 2003).
The particular trajectory of movement through a place field can
also influence its firing (Shapiro et al., 1997), especially in situ-
ations where multiple over-learned trajectories are present. The
modulation of place cell firing by non-spatial factors demon-
strates that these cells do not simply represent location, but also
additional information about what happened in that location.
All of the above non-spatial, possibly experience-dependent,
influences modulating the firing of place cells may contribute to
the temporal variation in place cell firing occurring in parallel to
the spatial variation (Manns and Eichenbaum, 2009; MacDonald
et al., 2011). These factors may also contribute to the observa-
tion of extreme run-by-run variability in place cell firing (Fenton
and Muller, 1998). With regard to these findings, it is interesting
to note that variation of location in the vertical dimension also
strongly modulates place cell firing (Hayman et al., 2011), espe-
cially when rodents rear and explore the walls of the environment,
which is usually not tracked by standard recording equipment
(Muller et al., 1987).
Finally, we note the existence of two other important spa-
tial representations. Head-direction cells which are found along
Papez’s circuit from the mamillary bodies through the anterior
thalamus, presubiculum, and entorhinal cortex, encode the ani-
mal’s current head direction (Taube, 1998). Each cell fires when
the head points in a specific allocentric direction, irrespective
of the animal’s location, so that the population of cells provides
a compass-like signal. Grid cells, which are found in entorhi-
nal cortex (Hafting et al., 2005) and pre- and para-subiculum
(Boccara et al., 2010), fire whenever the animal enters any one
of several locations in its environment. Interestingly, the firing
locations of a grid cell lie at the vertices of an amazingly reg-
ular triangular grid across the environment, with different cells
having grids which may have a different offset or scale relative
to the environment, but tend to have the same orientation. It
is thought that the population of grid cells supports path inte-
gration: updating their firing patterns in response to self-motion
(e.g., McNaughton et al., 2006). The orientations of the place,
grid, and head-direction cell representations appear to be linked
in that they all rotate coherently when, for example, distal visual
cues to orientation are rotated.
A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF SPATIAL REPRESENTATION
IN HUMANS
The BVC model of place cell firing has been used as a starting
point to define the functional architecture of human spatial cog-
nition and imagery (Becker and Burgess, 2001; Burgess et al.,
2001; Byrne et al., 2007). The basic idea is that a partial cue
concerning the surrounding boundaries and visual textures of
a familiar environment can cause reactivation of the complete
place cell representation corresponding to a single location. The
recurrent connections between place cells in area CA3 constrain
activity there to remain within the subset of patterns of activ-
ity consistent with being in a single location. These patterns of
activity form a continuous attractor within the space of pos-
sible patterns of activity, so that patterns of activity can move
smoothly between the representations of different locations, while
avoiding patterns of activity corresponding to being in more than
one place simultaneously (the vast majority of possible patterns).
See Zhang (1996) and Samsonovich and McNaughton (1997) for
computational models, andNakazawa et al. (2002) andWills et al.
(2005) for experimental support. The place cells then reactivate
the complete representations of boundaries and visual textures via
reciprocal connections back to parahippocampal and perirhinal
cortices.
To allow imagery, the allocentric BVC representation (speci-
fying layout in terms of North, South, etc.) must be translated
into egocentric coordinates (i.e., left, right relative to the head).
This translation is proposed to occur in posterior parietal and
retrosplenial cortices, where neurons encode locations in com-
bined egocentric and allocentric reference frames (Galletti et al.,
1995; Snyder et al., 1998). The translation process requires the
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current (or imagined) viewing direction, which is specified by
the head-direction cells found along Papez’s circuit (Taube, 1998).
The final egocentric image is supported by medial parietal areas
(see Figure 3: green and black components).
Thus, at a more abstract level, the place cells can be thought
of as constraining the activation of information in medial tempo-
ral neocortical areas to self-consistent subsets that correspond to
being in a single location. For example, when imagining being at
a concert, if the orchestra is ahead of you, then the circle must be
behind you, the exit to your left, etc. See Recce and Harris (1996)
for related discussion of the relationship between place cell firing
andMarr’s (1971) model of associative memory. The requirement
for specification of a viewing direction (by head-direction cells),
provides one potential role for (extra-hippocampal) Papez’s cir-
cuit in recollection, and its impairment in patients with damage
to it (e.g., Tsivilis et al., 2008).
The imposition of a viewpoint location (via place cells) and
viewing direction (via head-direction cells) on the products of
retrieval from long-term (allocentric) memory stores allows the
creation of spatially coherent (egocentric) scenes in medial pari-
etal areas. Beyond this, imagery should allow dynamic movement
of viewpoint, as when imagining the sequence of events in an
episode or journey. The model proposed a mechanism for updat-
ing the viewpoint position by motor efference signals in the case
of actual movement, or by mock motor efference signals gen-
erated by medial prefrontal areas in the case of imagery and
planning. The original mechanism (Becker and Burgess, 2001;
Burgess et al., 2001) proposed that the egocentric-allocentric
translation mechanism could also be used to perform the pro-
cess of spatial updating. However, the subsequent discovery of
grid cells (Hafting et al., 2005), and their association with path
integration, suggests that grid cells might support this process
instead.
How does our model compare to other models? There are
many characterizations of the roles of different regions of the
medial temporal lobes in memory (e.g., Aggleton and Brown,
1999; Eacott and Gaffan, 2005; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Mayes
et al., 2007). The prevailing view is that the perirhinal cortex
is particularly specialized for representing objects, the parahip-
pocampal cortex is specialized for representing spatial “contexts”
or places, and the hippocampus binds together outputs from both
these areas to represent episodes as a whole (the objects in the
correct spatial contexts). Computational models similarly locate
the hippocampus as the region responsible for binding the output
of different cortical regions into a unified representation of all of
the facets that constitute an episode (e.g., Marr, 1971; Teyler and
DiScenna, 1986; McClelland et al., 1995; Rolls and Treves, 1997;
Norman and O’Reilly, 2003). One specific proposal of this type,
that looks beyond purely mnemonic processing, is that the hip-
pocampus is specialized for the formation of associations between
disparate elements of an episode, occurring across space and time
and in the flexible manipulation of learned relationships among
items (the relational memory theory; Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993; see also Olsen et al., 2012 and Zeithamova et al., 2012).
Our conceptualization of hippocampal function shares obvi-
ous similarities with these theories, particularly regarding the rep-
resentations supported by the perirhinal and parahippocampal
cortices. Our goal is not to refute these models, but to specify
more precisely the neural representations supported by the hip-
pocampus, and to explain how and why the hippocampus binds
or relates together the output of some of these neocortical regions.
First, when imagining being in an environment, the hippocampus
is necessary to locate oneself within the imagined scene and to
represent the shape of the environment with respect to extended
boundaries. Thus, the hippocampus is required to form mental
images of scenes that are spatially coherent rather than simply
stereotyped lists of the content of a scene. Second, when visual-
izing a scene, reciprocal connections between place cells and cells
representing objects in perirhinal cortex constrain the retrieval of
objects that are consistent with being in a specific location within
the environment (Burgess et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 2007). Thus,
place cells enable efficient search through the mass of abstract
viewpoint-independent information stored elsewhere in the cor-
tex. At the end of the next section we will discuss the similarities
and distinctions between our model and relational processing
theories of hippocampal function.
EVIDENCE FOR SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN HUMANS
A wealth of studies have demonstrated that the hippocampus
is necessary for spatial memory in humans (Smith and Milner,
1981; Abrahams et al., 1997; Bohbot et al., 2002; King et al., 2004),
see Burgess et al. (2002) for a review. Nevertheless, more specific
studies are necessary to demonstrate that humans exhibit behav-
ior consistent with the use of place-cell-like representations of
space. The particular importance of the hippocampus in repre-
senting topographical layout was demonstrated by Hartley et al.
(2007). In this study, patients with hippocampal damage were
asked to recognize mountain landscapes from different view-
points across short delays. In the spatial subtests, the topography
of the landscape remained constant but the lighting and color of
the vegetation was altered (simulating changes in the time of day
and the seasons). In the non-spatial subtests participants were
required to ignore the topography but match the lighting and
vegetation. The patients were all impaired on the topographical
subtests but not the non-spatial control tasks which were closely
matched for performance in young controls. Lee and colleagues
have reported similar findings (Lee et al., 2005a,b).
More direct evidence that humans use place-cell-like represen-
tations of space in spatial memory comes from a virtual reality
study by Hartley et al. (2004). Participants were required to
remember the location of a flag encountered within a rectangular
arena surrounded by distal cues for orientation. In the test period
they moved to where they thought the flag had been located. On
some trials, the dimensions of the environment were altered dur-
ing the delay between study and test, in a similar manner to the
study of O’Keefe and Burgess detailed above. The spatial distri-
bution of responses were better predicted by a model assuming
that the location was encoded by BVCs than by alternative mod-
els assuming representation of the location in terms of the angles
to the corners, or the distances to walls etc.
Place cell firing is influenced by environmental boundaries
more so than intramaze landmarks (cf. O’Keefe and Burgess,
1996; Cressant et al., 1997). Similarly, the human hippocampus
is involved in learning locations relative to a boundary wall than
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relative to a landmark within the arena bounded by that wall.
Doeller et al. (2008) asked participants to remember the loca-
tions of objects presented within a circular arena in the presence
of a landmark cue (a traffic cone). To ensure that participants
attended to both task-relevant cues (the boundary and the land-
mark), on some trials these cues moved relative to each other and
half of the objects moved to a target location consistent with the
boundary wall whilst the other half moved to a target location
consistent with the intramaze landmark. Learning relative to the
boundary wall correlated with hippocampal activation whereas
learning relative to the landmark correlated with the activation in
the dorsal striatum and parietal lobe.
These studies all suggest that humans do indeed use simi-
lar, hippocampally mediated, spatial representations to rodents.
However, some studies have provided more direct evidence for
this. In a virtual reality navigation task, Ekstrom et al. (2003)
described single units in patients with epilepsy that had properties
similar to place cells, and were clustered in the hippocampus. In
a related finding, Morgan et al. (2011) used fMRI scanning while
participants looked at pictures of a familiar environment. They
found fMRI “adaptation” in the hippocampus according to the
physical proximity of the locations from which the pictures were
taken, consistent with a neuronal representation of environmental
location in the hippocampus.
Unlike place cells (Redish et al., 2000; Dombeck et al., 2010),
the firing patterns of grid cells show some topographical orga-
nization. Simultaneously recorded grid cells have grid-like fir-
ing fields with the similar orientations in environmental space
(Hafting et al., 2005; Barry et al., 2007). Thus, the neuronal fir-
ing dynamics within entorhinal cortex might differ according to
whether the participant (in a virtual environment) is running
either aligned or misaligned to the three principal directions of
the grids. The predicted 6-peaked modulation of fMRI signal as
a function of running direction was observed in human entorhi-
nal cortex (Doeller et al., 2010). Intriguingly, a similar pattern was
seen throughout the autobiographical memory system. We might
speculate that grid cells allow dynamic translation of the view-
point used to construct imagery, consistent with their role in path
integration.
The studies described above all support the view that humans
use similar neural representations of space as rodents. However,
we are still left with the question, are these representations actu-
ally used for mental imagery? Direct evidence that the hippocam-
pus is necessary for imagining environments comes from a study
by Hassabis et al. (2007b). A group of patients with hippocampal
damage were asked to imagine themselves in a large-scale space
(such as on a beach) and describe what was around them. As a
group, the patients’ descriptions were poorer in detail than the
controls’, and particularly lacked spatial coherence. When healthy
adults performed this task in an fMRI experiment, the hippocam-
pus was activated (Hassabis et al., 2007a), see also Addis et al.
(2007).
Whilst the studies of Hassabis and colleagues point to a con-
tribution of the hippocampus to imagination, they do not test
a specific model of what this contribution might be. We set out
to test a specific prediction of the model discussed above in an
imagery study using fMRI (Bird et al., 2010). Under the BVC
model of place cell firing, the influence of a given object (a
landmark or a boundary) on the place cell representation of loca-
tion is proportional to the horizontal angle subtended by it at
the participant. Accordingly, increasing the number of enclosing
environmental boundaries should boost the contribution of the
hippocampus to orientation within that environment. The model
makes the same prediction for imagined environments. If we can
engineer a situation whereby we can manipulate the number of
enclosing boundaries in the environments that participants imag-
ine standing within, then we should be able to observe the effect of
imagining more or fewer boundaries on the hippocampal BOLD
response.
The experiment is summarized in Figure 2. Participants were
shown aerial views of simple environments made of walls and
towers and then required to imagine standing within the envi-
ronments. We varied parametrically the number of enclosing
walls in the imagined scenes, while keeping the overall number
of structural elements constant. The experiment also included a
non-spatial, difficulty control, were we varied the colors of the
structural elements. Both the numbers of boundaries and the
color complexity affected task difficulty. Interestingly, the con-
ditions with intermediate numbers of boundaries were reliably
the most difficult to imagine, indicating that participants found
correctly imagining the configurations of towers and walls more
complex than scenes containing mostly towers or mostly walls.
Despite this, there was a significant parametric effect of increasing
numbers of boundaries in the hippocampus but no correlation
with increasing spatial complexity of the scenes.
We will briefly consider these findings with respect to other
conceptualizations of hippocampal function that have been
advanced in this Special Issue. Similarly to ourmodel, several cur-
rent theories stress the particular types of representation and pro-
cessing supported by the hippocampus. In this respect, both these
theories and our model differ from theories that stress the type
of memories that that the hippocampus support, for example,
that the hippocampus has a specialized role in long-term declar-
ative memory or in consciously accessible memories (Cohen and
Squire, 1980; Moscovitch, 1995; Squire et al., 2004; see Hannula
and Greene, 2012). One of the most popular positions is that the
hippocampus is specialized for relational processing. This theory
can be applied to a wide range of materials whether conscious
or non-conscious, and to tasks requiring online guidance of
behavior as well those involving a delay. For example, hippocam-
pally mediated representations of the relationships between items
may be important for aspects of linguistic processing (Duff and
Brown-Schmidt, 2012; see also O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978) and
reasoning (Zeithamova et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it remains a
challenge to specify precisely which representations and which
relations require hippocampal support, and how they might cor-
respond to the “elements” of an episodic memory. Some authors
have attempted to clarify this (Cohen et al., 1999; Mayes et al.,
2007), but it is not clear whether these definitions are universally
accepted by adherents of the theory.
Both ourselves and Lee et al. (2012) have focussed on the
role of the hippocampus in spatial processing, for which some of
these questions can be addressed with more specificity. For exam-
ple, O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) suggest that the hippocampus is
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FIGURE 2 | In this fMRI study, participants were asked to imagine standing in
various different environments containing combinations of boundaries (walls)
and towers (non-boundary environmental elements) and turning through
360◦ . Aerial views of the environments used are shown in panel (A). The
number of enclosing boundaries was varied between 0 and 4, whilst the total
number of boundaries and towers was always 5. Complexity was also
manipulated by varying the colors of the boundaries and towers. Panel (B)
shows ratings of how difficult each condition was to imagine; intermediate
numbers of boundaries and the striped colored conditions were rated most
difficult. Panel (C) shows a parametric modulation of activity in a region of the
left hippocampus with increasing numbers of boundaries in the imagined
scenes. This region is shown in (D). These results are consistent with the
hippocampus representing location within an imagined environment with
respect to extended environmental boundaries.
specifically concerned with flexible representations of space, i.e.,
those that allow a particular location to be found from different
starting points and independently of rigid (habitual) routes or
learned responses to individual stimuli. The same idea of flex-
ibility is incorporated into the idea of relational memory, and
generalized beyond the spatial domain (Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993). The independence from individual stimuli is taken up by
Lee et al., who suggest that “the hippocampus processes complex
conjunctions of spatial features,” see also Sutherland and Rudy
(1989).
In this review and elsewhere, we have tried to further spec-
ify which conjunctions of spatial features are supported by the
hippocampal formation, and how they are used to support mem-
ory, imagery, and navigation. By attempting to understand spa-
tial processing from a neuronal level, we can show that some
“elements” of a scene are preferentially processed by the hip-
pocampus (e.g., environmental boundaries versus local land-
marks; Doeller et al., 2008; Bird et al., 2010), and that some
type of processing are favored (e.g., incidental versus reinforce-
ment learning, Doeller and Burgess, 2008, see also Tolman,
1948; Hirsch, 1974; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). In the imag-
ing study detailed above (Figure 2), a purely relational process-
ing account might have predicted greatest hippocampal activity
when imagining scenes comprising roughly equal numbers of
walls and towers, since these were most difficult to imagine.
However, no regions within the hippocampus showed this pat-
tern, whereas, a region of hippocampus did show a correlation
with increasing numbers of environmental boundaries, consis-
tent with our model. A challenge for the future is to make
similarly detailed predictions regarding other types of hippocam-
pally mediated relational processing such as relating items across
time.
In summary, the studies we have presented provide a strong
case for the role of the hippocampus in both the retrieval of
information to construct mental imagery, and in constrain-
ing the resultant image to be spatially coherent. The combi-
nation of rodent and human data support a model whereby
retrieval reflects place cell firing in the hippocampus, which
reinstates the (spatial) contextual characteristics of an event
via activation of parahippocampal and perirhinal cortices. The
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key aspect of retrieval via place cell activity is that the poten-
tially myriad products of retrieval are constrained to all be
consistent with observation from the same viewpoint location,
ensuring that images are constructed in a spatially coherent
manner. These (allocentric) medial temporal representations
can then form an egocentric projection in medial parietal
areas, given imposition of a viewing direction provided by
head-direction cells. This latter step requires processing by
“gain field” neurons in parietal cortex and parieto-occipital
sulcus. The end product of this reconstructive process allows
boundaries and objects in spatial configurations consistent with
a single specific viewpoint to be experienced as egocentric
imagery.
LOST HIPPOCAMPAL CONTROL ANDWHEN “IMAGERY
GOES WRONG”
In addition to providing a neural-level explanation of the pro-
cesses of imagery and retrieval in healthy memory, we can use the
model to generate predictions about the way in which imagery
can go wrong if the hippocampal provision of contextual sup-
port is lost or weakened. One example of when imagery can
“go wrong” involves memory for traumatic events. Following the
experience of trauma, memories for the episode can intrude into
an individual’s consciousness in the form of distressing sensory-
bound images, as in PTSD. In this section, we extend the model
and detail the way in which different representational systems for
an event can be affected in different ways and, specifically, how
down-regulation of the hippocampus within this model might
contribute to involuntary retrieval of imagery. This view is consis-
tent with the “dual representation” account of intrusive imagery
development following a traumatic event (see Jacobs and Nadel,
1985; Brewin et al., 2010).
In the spirit of the dual representation account, the infor-
mation in an event can be encoded in two different ways. As
detailed above, long-term allocentric contextual representations
(or “C-reps”) are encoded in the hippocampus and surrounding
medial temporal lobe (Figure 3: green components). In addition,
short-term egocentric representations of the sensory and affective
aspects of an event are supported by a second system, including
the amygdala, insula, and sensory association areas. These images,
comprising central sensory/perceptual features of an experience
provide a sensory-bound representation, or S-rep, of a scene
that is dependent on the perceiver’s viewpoint (Figure 3: red
components).
For a neutral event, initial sensory-based representations will
become relatively inaccessible as they quickly decay. Over time,
C-reps will become integrated within semantic and autobio-
graphical memory via hippocampal and neocortical interactions
(Marr, 1970, 1971; McClelland et al., 1995), providing a basis for
the generation of meaningful interpretations and the construc-
tion of novel images through recombination of past objects and
scenes. Egocentric imagery can be generated in medial parietal
areas from C-reps, via the process of allocentric to egocentric
translation, as described above. If lower-level sensory informa-
tion is retained, it could be retrieved via associations with the
egocentric image, providing more vivid sensory and affective
quality to imagery. Retrieval, whether voluntary or involuntary,
and the construction of mental imagery are under top-down con-
trol, modulated by the hippocampus and its connections from
prefrontal areas.
TRAUMA-RELATED ALTERATIONS IN MEMORY
REPRESENTATIONS AND RELATED IMAGERY
Although initial egocentric imagery is expected to rapidly decay
as more stable allocentric representations are encoded in the hip-
pocampus and medial temporal lobe, in some situations these
less flexible images might persist for longer. Alterations in stress
responses during an event provide one instance where such rep-
resentations might actually be enhanced. It is well established
that the experience of an emotional event can facilitate memory
(Cahill and McGaugh, 1998). During a stressful episode, imme-
diate interoceptive representations of bodily responses become
associated with sensory information of a scene, mediated by
insular cortex and amygdale (LeDoux, 1996; Craig, 2002, 2009;
Critchley et al., 2004), creating a stronger and more endur-
ing S-rep. The storage of a corresponding C-rep with the
S-rep enables its accessibility to voluntary retrieval and allows
the integration of event-related information into semantic and
autobiographical memory systems. Intact C-reps provide con-
text dependency of event-related information and the preven-
tion of spontaneous reactions to environmental stimuli through
inhibitory prefrontal pathways, modulated by the hippocampus
(Kim and Fanselow, 1992; Anagnostaras et al., 1999; Anderson
et al., 2004). The reconstruction of mental imagery from a tran-
sient stressful event would be facilitated, resulting in the activa-
tion of strengthened S-reps top-down via corresponding higher
level representations, experienced as egocentric imagery from the
same viewpoint in the precuneus.
For imagery to “go wrong” and become liable to sponta-
neously intrude into consciousness, an extreme level of stress
would be required to disrupt hippocampal function (e.g., Kim
and Diamond, 2002; Payne et al., 2007). Down-regulation of
the hippocampus will result in an impoverished C-rep. In con-
trast, physiological reactions of the event that contribute to S-reps
are strengthened via simultaneous increases in amygdala activ-
ity (LaBar et al., 1998). The resulting imbalance of an enduring
S-rep and impoverished C-rep creates a persistent emotion-laden
mental image of the scene without a coherent spatial context.
Voluntary retrieval and the ability to construct mental imagery in
a controlled way are impaired due to the decrease in hippocampal
support and its mediation of top-down control. S-reps can there-
fore, be triggered involuntarily through the experience of sensory
inputs in the environment that share similarities to character-
iztics of the original event. Reactivation of an S-rep without its
corresponding C-rep results in the re-experience of vivid egocen-
tric imagery and associated affective and physiological reactions.
These representations would suffer an inability to integrate infor-
mation into long-term memory due to the absence of robust
associated C-reps. It should be noted that damage to the hip-
pocampal system alone would not result in intrusive imagery. For
this to occur, an impoverished C-rep must be accompanied by the
creation of an enduring S-rep through an extreme event such as
a trauma. Interestingly, some cognitive behavioral therapies for
remediation of PTSD can be seen as attempts to (re)establish a
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FIGURE 3 | A schematic model of memory and imagery, showing the
approximate regions and pathways involved in, and supporting, abstracted
contextual representations (C-reps, in green) and sensory bound
representations (S-reps, in red). Scenes with strong affective content create
enduring S-reps supported by amygdale, sensory areas and insula.
S-reps are normally reactivated voluntary via a corresponding C-rep,
but strong S-reps with weak association to C-reps can cause involuntary
intrusive imagery.
robust C-rep in association with a traumatic S-rep, see Brewin
et al. (2010) for further discussion.
EVIDENCE RELATING INTRUSIVE IMAGERY TO AN
IMBALANCE IN MEMORY REPRESENTATIONS
To directly assess the way in which the balance between ego-
centric and allocentric representations of an event might con-
tribute to intrusive imagery, we devised a study to investigate
spontaneous imagery experiences following exposure to stress-
ful material and concurrently assessed egocentric and allocentric
memory performance in the same individuals (Bisby et al., 2010).
We utilized an analog trauma paradigm as a method to assess
intrusive imagery, which involves the presentation of film clips
from real-life traumatic events. Participants are required to record
any intrusive imagery of the footage over the following week
and then return for a test of explicit recall (see Holmes and
Bourne, 2008). We used alcohol as a pharmacological tool to
dissociate memory processes. Acute administration of alcohol
has been shown to disrupt hippocampal-dependent memory in
rodents (Matthews et al., 1995; White et al., 1998) and humans
(Curran and Hildebrandt, 1999; Leitz et al., 2009). In a previ-
ous study assessing intrusive imagery following encoding of a
stressful film, alcohol administered prior to watching the film
was shown to affect intrusive imagery in different ways at dif-
ferent doses (Bisby et al., 2009). Individuals administered a low
dose of alcohol were found to record significantly more intru-
sive images compared to those given a placebo drink, whereas
participants in the high dose alcohol group showed a reduction
in the number of intrusive images. It is interesting to note that
explicit memory testing after one week followed a different pat-
tern of results, with decreasing memory performance as alcohol
dose increased.
The balance between allocentric and egocentric memory was
measured by examining viewpoint dependence within a virtual
reality spatial memory task (King et al., 2002, 2004). In this task,
participants encode object locations within a virtual environment
and memory is tested from the same-viewpoint as encoding or
from a shifted-viewpoint. Shifted-view performance requires an
intact allocentric representation, presumably supported by the
hippocampus and surrounding structures. In contrast, same-view
recognition can be solved by an egocentric representation of the
scene through recognition of object locations relative to the per-
ceiver’s original viewpoint. Support for a role of the hippocam-
pus in this task has been provided by findings from a patient
with focal bilateral hippocampal pathology (Jon: Vargha-Khadem
et al., 1997), who was unable to recognize object locations from
a shifted-viewpoint, whereas same-view performance was intact
(King et al., 2002, 2004).
The results from this study are summarized in Figure 4.
We replicated previous findings showing an alcohol-induced
dose-dependent inverted U-shaped curve on intrusive imagery.
Participants administered low dose alcohol prior to encoding the
traumatic material showed a significant increase in the number of
intrusive images experienced following exposure to the stressful
material, whereas the high dose group showed no such increase.
Further, explicit recall of the footage was affected in a linear
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FIGURE 4 | Alterations in (A) the number of intrusive images reported
by participants over 7 days following exposure to a stressful film
and (B) explicit memory for the footage on day 8 as a function of
alcohol dose. Object location recognition tested from the (C)
same-view as encoding was spared under low dose alcohol but
impaired by high dose, whereas (D) shifted-view recognition was impaired
following the administration of low and high doses [adapted from Bisby et al.
(2010)].
manner following alcohol with greater decreases in the number
of items remembered as dose increased. Results on viewpoint-
dependent memory performance were complementary, with the
low dose group showing a selective reduction in shifted-view
object location recognition and spared same-view performance.
In those participants administered high dose alcohol, perfor-
mance was impaired on both same- and shifted-view conditions
of the task, demonstrating a global impairment in memory.
Interestingly, in individuals with intact egocentric memory, evi-
denced by high same-view recognition performance, decrements
in shifted-view recognition were correlated with increases in
intrusive imagery experiences. Overall, these findings support a
model whereby intrusive imagery occurs due an imbalance in
C-reps and S-reps during exposure to a stressful event.
SUMMARY
To attempt to form a mechanistic neural-level model of the func-
tion of the hippocampus, we took inspiration from the detailed
spatial correlates of neuronal firing in and around the hippocam-
pus, Papez’s circuit and posterior parietal cortices. The properties
of these cells, how they represent spatial location, environmental
boundaries, spatial orientation, and viewing direction, indicate
a very specific model for how spatial information is retrieved
and processed to form mental imagery for scenes (see Becker
and Burgess, 2001; Burgess et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 2007).
In the first half of the paper we reviewed this model and
some of the supporting experimental evidence gathered since
its original proposal. The model is not necessarily incompat-
ible with other psychological models of the hippocampal role
in memory or imagery but, by considering the constraints and
information provided by spatial paradigms, it provides a very spe-
cific description of the neural mechanisms and representations
involved.
In the second half of the paper, we outlined a recent exten-
sion of the model (Brewin et al., 2010) which aims to provide
a neurophysiological implementation of the dual representation
model of PTSD (see Jacobs and Nadel, 1985; Brewin et al., 2010).
This model makes several predictions at the neuronal and behav-
ioral levels. We review evidence for one of these predictions (Bisby
et al., 2010); that intrusive imagery follows from encoding condi-
tions in which (presumably hippocampal-dependent) allocentric
spatial representations are impaired relative to egocentric spatial
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representations. A neuronal prediction would be that decreased
hippocampal activation at encoding leads to increased subse-
quent intrusive imagery, in contrast to the well-known effect of
increased hippocampal activation at encoding leading to increased
declarative memory (e.g., Davachi and Wagner, 2002).
In summary, single unit recordings from rodents in spatial
paradigms provides enough detailed information concerning the
relationship of neuronal firing to behavioral variables to be able
to describe a specific neuronal model of processing in and around
the hippocampus. We have used such a model to investigate the
contribution of the hippocampus to retrieval and imagery for
spatial scenes. The results imply that the hippocampus ensures
a unique and common viewpoint for retrieved information: pro-
viding a coherent allocentric spatial context within which imagery
can take place. In the absence of such a context, the encoding of
strong (a-contextual egocentric) sensory and affective represen-
tations of traumatic events can lead to an increased incidence of
subsequent intrusive imagery.
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